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Abstract 
This paper, using individual data from Japan, explores how the circumstances of 
where a person resides is related to the degree of their investment in social capital. 
Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects and various individual 
characteristics, I found: (1) Not only is the rate of homeowners in a locality positively 
related to investment in social capital, but the rate of homeownership there increases 
an individual‟s investment in social capital. (2) The effect of local neighborhood 
homeownership is distinctly larger than that of an individual‟s when endogeneity bias is 
controlled for using instruments such as land price and the rental price of an 
apartment.  
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1. Introduction 
Recently, there has been a growing number of regional studies focusing on the issue of 
social capital (e.g., Glaeser and Redlick 2008; Kilkenny 2006; Westlund 2007). Glaeser 
et al. (2002). These studies have applied an investment model for analysis of social 
capital formation. In this model, the accumulation of social capital depends on an 
individual‟s decision making concerning investment in social activities. Based on this 
individual decision making, from the view point of the spatial dimension, empirical 
studies have attempted to investigate how and the extent to which social capital is 
accumulated. These studies make it evident that homeowners are more likely to invest 
in social capital because of their lower mobility rates (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; 
Hilber 2007).  
On the other hand, a household‟s social ties with neighbors, which can be considered 
a kind of social capital, lead to benefits for residents through the reduction of 
transaction costs and through non-market reciprocal behavior1. Residents get benefits 
from the community services provided by community member‟s collective action. 
Monitoring and sanctioning free riders is important to resolve the free rider problem 
when collective action is required. The larger the social capital is, the more effective and 
stronger monitoring and sanctioning are through ostracism or opprobrium, resulting in 
greater benefits. Social capital can be regarded as local public goods and so only 
community members get the benefits from this social capital (Hayami 2001) 2 . 
                                                   
1 Social capital was found to improve health status through non-market personal 
interaction (Kawachi et al. 1997, 1999). 
2 Because of the disappearance of this benefit when a household moves from the current 
address where larger social capital is accumulated, the incentive for moving is reduced 
leading to low residential mobility (Kan 2007). 
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Furthermore, sanctioning and monitoring mechanisms strengthened by lower 
population mobility lead people to invest in social capital3.  
 Not only an individual‟s characteristics, but also those of their neighbors are 
expected to have an important effect on a resident‟s behavior concerning investment in 
social capital4. However, the level of homeownership among neighbors has not been 
investigated, with the exception of DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999)5. Furthermore, 
although investment in social capital appears to depend on socio-economic conditions, 
there are few investigations outside those conducted in Western countries. To compare 
the results from Western countries with the rest of world, it is necessary to analyze how 
social capital is accumulated in countries other than Western ones.  
For instance, comparative studies have shown that the influence of surrounding 
people on individual behavior is greater in Japan than in United States (e.g., Benedict 
1946, Ames 1981, Yamagishi 1988a, 1988b). In addition, the importance of social capital 
on the process of economic development in Japan is increasingly recognized (e.g., 
Yamamura, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a). These reports suggest that individual 
investment in social capital is significantly affected by the character of neighbors in 
Japan, thereby affecting economic performance. From a comparative viewpoint of 
                                                   
3 Benabou and Tirole (2006) develop a theoretical model in which social reputation or 
pressure from other individuals such as neighbors‟ influences motivation for prosocial 
behavior.  
4 People are found to be less inclined to cooperate to resolve collective problems in more 
heterogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Yamamura 2008b). 
5 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) explored the effects of individual homeownership and 
neighbor‟s homeownership on social capital formation. This work, however, focused 
mainly on effect of individual homeownership rather than that of neighbor ‟s 
homeownership.  
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regional development, Japan as a case study is thought interesting. This paper uses 
individual level data from Japan to investigate the effects of individual homeownership 
and that of neighbors; I then compare the former with the latter.  
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: In section 2, the 
characteristics of Japanese society are outlined to provide a back ground for the study 
and highlight the features of social capital in Japanese society. Section3 describes data, 
methods of analysis and estimation strategies. The results of the estimations and their 
interpretation are provided in section 4. The final section offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Features of Japanese society  
Japan appears characterized by a racially and economically homogeneous 
society with long-term interpersonal relationships, resulting in an abundance of 
accumulated social capital (Fukuyama 1995). In line with this view, the classical work 
of Kawashima (1963) focuses on Japan‟s cultural preference for informal mechanisms of 
dispute resolution and asserts that the harmonious nature of Japan discourages people 
from litigation. Contrary to this view, a number of works have argued that the 
reluctance for litigation in Japan can be explained by individualistic reasons rather 
than a harmonious nature when people are confronted with conflict (e.g., Ginsburg and 
Hoetker 2006, Haley 1978, Ramseyer 1988, Ramseyer and Nakazato 1989, 1999). 
Monitoring and sanctioning each other‟s behavior plays a greater role in improper 
actions such as free-riding in a tightly knitted community (Hayami 2001). Monitoring 
and sanctioning improper behavior is considered to be stronger in Japan than in the 
United States (Ames 1981). Such mechanisms can theoretically be explained by game 
theory, which is in line with individualistic behavior (Grief 1993, Kandori 1992). These 
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facts lead us to conjecture that the “harmonious nature” assigned to the Japanese is 
heavily based on the monitoring and sanctioning system and is not inconsistent with 
rational individuals.  
The classical work of Benedict(1946) points out that the cultural collectivism in 
Japanese society is “externally” sustained by a system of mutual monitoring and 
sanctioning rather than “internally” sustained by an internalized value system. 
According to Yamagishi (1988a, 1988b), Japanese society provides a system of mutual 
monitoring to reduce the incentives for free riding. However, Americans have a higher 
level of generalized trust than Japanese in situations where mutual monitoring and 
sanction do not exist (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994, Yamagishi et al 1998). This is 
contrary to the seemingly general view of trust among Japanese (Fukuyama 1995). 
What comes out of these works is that Japanese people are more likely to be affected by 
long-term interpersonal relationships even if they are more individualistic than 
Western people. Social norms stemming from monitoring and sanctioning within the 
Japanese community are considered a crucial factor enhancing collective actions such 
as responding to a census (Yamamura 2008 b) and voting behavior (Yamamura 2008 e).  
The characteristics of neighbors influence the degree to which a community 
functions well. Neighbors are thus expected to play a major role in an individual‟s 
decision making concerning investment in social capital. Hence, Japanese society is 
considered as an ideal case to analyze how and the extent to which the presence of 
neighbors has an influence on investment in social capital when an individual‟s 
characteristics are controlled for. Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the effects of 
individual homeownership and neighbor homeownership on the formation of social 
capital in Japan. 
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3. Data and Methods 
3.1. Data 
This paper uses JGSS data, which are individual level data6. The JGSS surveys 
adopted a two-stage stratified sampling method and were conducted throughout Japan 
in 2003. JGSS was designed as the Japanese counterpart to the General Social Survey 
in the United States. This survey asks standard questions concerning an individual‟s 
and his/her family characteristics through face-to-face interviews. This data covers 
information related to one‟s marital and demographic (age and gender) status, annual 
income7, years of schooling, age, number of children, kind of residence, characteristics of 
respondent‟s residential area8, size of residential area, and prefecture of residence. 
According to the population size of a geographical area, sampling points were divided 
into three groups; (1) large cities, (2) other cities, and (3) villages and towns. Data were 
collected on 3663 adults, between 20 and 89 years-old. The variables used for regression 
                                                   
6Data for this secondary analysis, "Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center 
for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of 
Tokyo. 
7 There are 19 income categories. (1) None, (2) Less than 700,000 yen, (3) 700,000– 1 
million yen, (4) 1– 1.3 million yen, (5) 1.3 – 1.5 million yen, (6) 1.5– 2.5 million yen, (7) 
2.5– 3.5 million yen , (8) 3.5 – 4.5 million yen, (9) 4.5– 5.5 million yen, (10) 5.– 6.5 
million yen, (11) 6.5– 7.5 million yen, (12) 7.5– 8.5 million yen, (13) 8.– 10 million yen, 
(14) 10– 12 million yen, (15) 12 – 14 million yen,(16) 14– 16 million yen, (17) 16– 18.5 
million yen, (18) 18.5 – 23 million yen, (19) 23 million yen or over. 
8 There are 5 area categories; (1) Area where a number of factories are located, (2) Area 
where a number of stores and offices are located, (3) Old residential area (residential 
area from the pre-war period), (4) New residential area (including new towns developed 
after the war), (5) Farming/fishing village. 
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estimations are shown in Table 1, which provides definitions and basic statistics. I see 
from this that over half of the sample was collected from the medium-sized cities. One 
fourth of the sample is from villages and towns. Respondents did not respond 
completely to all questions, and therefore, the number of samples used for the 
regression estimations range between 1693 and 1545.  
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) defines the local group as each city-size category in 
each state, and calculate the local homeownership by calculating average 
homeownership rate in each group. Following DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), I define 
the local group as follows9: As explained above, sample points consist of 47 prefectures. 
Sample points were also divided into 3 groups categorized by population size. Hence, 
prefecture-population groups can be divided into 141, which are defined as local areas in 
this paper. Nevertheless, actually large cities exist only in 12 prefectures. One 
prefecture (Tokyo) does not contain town and village. Hence, there are 105 
prefecture-population groups. Based on these groups, the rate of homeowners is 
calculated. Table A1 in APPENDIX presents the rates of homeowners in each group. 
Putnam (2000) indicates that social capital is defined as the features of a 
social organization such as networks and norms, and that social trust facilitates 
coordination and cooperation. Hence, social capital can be interpreted in various 
ways; thereby causing ambiguity and criticism about it measurement and the 
definition (e.g., Paldam 2000; Durlauf 2002a, 2002b). It is necessary to use various 
indexes of social capital when analyzing the formation of social capital. DiPasquale 
and Glaeser (1999) examined the impact of homeownership using various variables to 
                                                   
9 It should be noted that a local group as defined in this paper does not reflect a 
geographical scale. Considering a geographical scale is beyond the scope of this paper. 
This is an issue remaining for future work. 
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capture investment in social capital 10 . Comprehensive analyses such as that of 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) are thus ideal. Conversely, the interpretation of results 
provided by such comprehensive analysis can be undertaken in various ways, making it 
difficult to clearly understand the implications of the results. Accordingly, for an 
in-depth study, it is important to focus on one aspect of social capital.  
Apprehension of bad behavior such as criminal acts depends on the watchfulness 
of citizens (Huck and Kosefeld, 2007). Neighborhood watches are likely to be more 
effective if the members are involved in community activity, resulting in a decrease in 
criminal acts and thereby raising benefits for residents. In the case of Japan, it has been 
reported that community involvement increases the benefit for community members by 
decreasing victims of natural disasters (Yamamura 2008d) and crimes (Yamamura 
2009b). These suggest that involvement in ones community has a critical role in 
Japanese society. Hence, this paper concentrates on community involvement to 
examine investment in social capital. Thus, social capital was measured based on the 
question “Are you actively involved in the activity of a neighborhood association?” 
Responses were scored as 1 (Yes) or 0 (No). The questionnaire included the following 
question concerning a respondent‟s residence, “In which of following do you live?” In this 
paper, a homeowner is defined by the respondent choosing “Own house” from the 
possible responses11.  
                                                   
10 Indexes of investment in social capital used in DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) are as 
follows; (1) membership of non-professional organizations, (2) knowing the names of 
local political leaders, (3) participation in solving local problem, (4) voting in local 
elections, degree of leisure activities, (5) gun ownership, and (6) church attendance. 
11 The possible responses to the question were “(1) Own house”, “(2) Own condominium 
(apartment)”, “(3) Rented house owned by a private company”, “(4) Rented apartment 
house owned by a private company,” “(5) Company house or house for government 
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As referred to later, this paper employs a two-stage model. 1975  In this mode, the 
1975 prices (per m2) for land and the rental price (per 3.3m2) of an apartment for a 
month  are used as instrumental variables. These variables are at the average values 
at a prefectural level. There are several factors concerning land prices in a prefecture; 
therefore, mean values are used here as the land price. The data used to calculate land 
price is available through the web pages of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transportation and Tourism12. The rental price of an apartment was obtained from the 
Index Corporation. (2006). 
 
3.2. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
Figure 1 shows a positive association between the homeowner rate and the rate of 
participation in neighborhood associations, indicating that a homeowner is more likely 
than a non-owner to invest in social capital. This result is in line with an earlier report 
that barriers to mobility give individuals an incentive to investment in social capital 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2007).   
I now explore how individual homeownership and the local circumstance of 
individuals, captured by neighbor homeownership, are related to individuals‟ 
investment in social capital. Following the model used by DiPasquale and Glaeser 
(1999), the estimated function takes the following form: 
                                                                                                                                                     
employees”, “(6) Company apartment house or apartment house for government 
employees”, “(7) Rented public house of a public corporation”, “(8) Rented public 
apartment of a public corporation”, “(9) Other”. 
12 http://www.land.mlit.go.jp/landPrice/AriaServlet?MOD=0&TYP=0 (accessed at 
November 27, 2009). There are various categories of land, such as land for business 
district, land for industrial district…etc. In this paper, the price of land for housing is 
used as the land price. 
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SC im= 0  + 1 HOME im+ 2AVHOMEm +3AVLIVE20im + 4MALEim+ 5AGEim+ 
6EDUim+7MARRIim+8CHILDim+9MCITYm+10TOWNim+ uim , 
where SC im represents the dependent variable in resident i, and area m. ‟s 
represents regression parameters. SC im takes 1 if one participates in the neighborhood 
association, otherwise takes 0. Hence, The Probit model is employed to conduct 
estimations. uim represents the error term.  
  It is reasonably to assume that observations might be spatially correlated within a 
given economic region, as neighborhood involvement of one agent might well relate to 
the involvement of another agent in the same neighborhood. In this study, such regions 
correspond to the 105 functional economic areas defined previously. To consider such 
spatial correlation in line with this assumption, I use the Stata Cluster command and 
report robust z-statistics. The advantage of this approach is that the magnitude of 
spatial correlation can be unique to each area.  
The individual homeownership dummy, HOME, is used to capture the homeowner 
effect. If a homeowner tends to invest in social capital, the anticipated sign of HOME is 
positive. As discussed by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), HOME is possibly correlated 
with the unmeasured factors included in uim. HOME is thus thought to be an 
endogenous variable, resulting in estimation bias. Assuming that a high rate of 
homeownership makes a region more stable and tightly knitted, AVHOME can be also 
considered as an endogenous variable. This is because an individual who tends to 
participate in neighborhood associations is likely to live in a stable community with a 
high rate of homeownership13. Hence, in added to the Probit estimation, I also conduct a 
                                                   
13 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) regard the average group homeownership rate as an 
exogenous variable and use it as an instrument variable. Though they fail to consider 
the possibility of the endogeneity of average group homeownership.  
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two-stage Probit estimation using the instrumental variables of HOME and AVHOME. 
In the first stage where HOME and AVHOME are dependent variables, HOME is a 
dummy variable and so Probit estimation should be employed; whereas AVHOME is not 
a dummy variable and so OLS estimation can be used. By conducting these estimations, 
the predicted values of HOME and AVHOME can be obtained and then used as 
independent variables in the second-stage Probit estimations.  
The rate of neighborhood homeownership can be regarded as the degree of local 
population immobility, since homeownership creates a barrier to mobility. It seems 
plausible for homeowners that better relations with neighbors increases the long-term 
benefits through interpersonal interactions since homeowners are less likely to move. 
Accordingly, homeowners have a tendency to invest in social capital for the purpose of 
maintaining good relationships or creating better associations among neighbors 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). Therefore, the sign of HOME is anticipated to become 
positive.  
Monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are not effective an area where 
interpersonal relationships are fragile, which leads to the free-rider problem and so 
makes collective action difficult. As a result, residents are less likely to invest in social 
capital. Furthermore, a lack of collective action reduces the benefit from the investment 
in social capital. To put it differently, if there is only a small amount of social capital in 
an area, the benefit obtained from participation in neighborhood association activity is 
reduced. Hence, a scarcity of social capital in an area reduces the incentive to invest in 
social capital. The corollary of this is that abundant social capital enhances an 
individual‟s investment in social capital and increases the benefit. Neighborhood 
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homeownership is measured by group average HOME rate (AVHOME)14. I see from 
Table 2 that the average HOME rate is lower in the larger areas mainly because land 
prices are higher in more urbanized areas. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that SC is 
larger in the smaller areas, presumably because the higher homeowner rate leads 
residents to invest in SC, which is consistent with the argument above. These lead us to 
expect AVHOME to take positive signs. 
In addition to HOME and AVHOME, several control variables are included to 
capture individual characteristics: male‟s dummy, age, years of schooling, number of 
children marital status. Furthermore, the size of the residential area is captured by 
MCITY (medium-size cities) and TOWN (town and village). The group living in 
large-size cities is the reference group.  
 
3.3. Instrumental Variable 
  It is reasonable to argue that whether individual becomes a homeowner depends on 
land prices. On the other hand, land prices are not related to the determinants of 
participation in neighborhood associations. Accordingly, the land price can be used as an 
instrumental variable of homeownership. Furthermore, as the decision to purchase has 
been made at an earlier time, it is more appropriate to use a land price in the past, 
rather than the current price. As well, historic average land price data at the prefecture 
level are available. Thus I used the average prefecture land price for 1975, LAND75, as 
an instrumental variable. Figure2 (a) shows the negative relationship between the land 
price in 1975 and the rate of home ownership in 2003, which is consistent with basic 
                                                   
14 To exclude an individual i‟ s effect from i‟ s local group average, i‟ s sample is omitted 
from the samples when local average values are calculated. 
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economic theory. In addition, the rental price of a private apartment is thought to reflect 
the land price and so its value in 1975, APART75, is employed as instrumental variables. 
On the other hand, an apartment is considered a substitute for a home. If this is true, 
higher prices for apartments lead to a higher rate of home ownership. The fact that the 
rental price of an apartment in 1975 reduces home ownership in 2003 is seen in Figure2 
(b), suggesting that the rental price of an apartment reflects the land price. 
 
4. Estimation Results and their Interpretation 
Table 3 reports results using a Probit model. In (columns 1) to (3), annual income 
dummies are incorporated, whereas in (4) to (6) annual income dummies are not 
included, leading to an increase of the sample size. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 4 and (1)-(3) 
in Table 5 present results including the annual income dummy. Columns (5)-(8) in Table 
4 and (4)-(6) in Table 5 present results excluding the annual income dummy. The 
omission of income dummies is thought to cause omitted variable bias, but subdues the 
sample selection bias. 
 
4.1. Probit model 
Looking at the first row in Table 3 shows that HOME has positive signs in all 
estimations, and is statistically significant. This implies that a homeowner is more 
likely to invest in social capital, which is consistent with DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999). 
With respect to the neighbor effect, AVHOME produces the expected positive signs in all 
estimations and is statistically insignificant. It follows from this that a barrier to 
mobility caused by individual characteristics enhances social capital investment, which 
is congruent with the anticipation. On the other hand, contrary to expectation, 
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neighbor‟s characteristics do not influence social capital investment. However, these 
results are thought to suffer from endogenous bias and so I proceed to analyze results 
that control for this bias by instrumental variables. 
 
4.2. Two-stage model 
  Table 4 presents results where the endogeneity of HOME or AVHOME is controlled 
for using an instrumental variable. In table 5, various sets of instrumental variables 
such as land price and the rental price of an apartment, and their squared values are 
used to estimate predicted values of HOME and AVHOME. In all results of the first 
stage estimations, the validity of two-stage estimations is shown in LR chi-square 
values in the Probit estimation for HOME and F-statistics in the OLS estimation for 
AVHOME. 
With respect to Table 4, HOME yields the expected positive signs and is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level in all estimations. When the rental price of an apartment is 
used as an instrumental variable, the magnitudes of the coefficients of AVHOME are 
remarkably larger than those of HOME; showing that neighborhood homeownership 
has a greater role in the increase of investment in social capital than individual 
homeownership. On the other hand, AVHOME produces positive signs in all estimations, 
but these are not significant when land price is used as an instrumental variable. The 
unstable results of AVHOME are thought to suffer from an omitted variable bias 
because both HOME and AVHOME are not incorporated in the function at the same 
time. Concerning the first stage, the coefficients of land price and the rental price of an 
apartment show the anticipated negative signs.  
I now turn to the results of Table 5 where both HOME and AVHOME are 
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simultaneously incorporated in the function as independent variables. In all 
estimations, HOME continues to exhibit significant positive signs at the 1 % level. On 
the other hand, it is interesting to observe that AVHOME yields, with the exception of 
column (5), significant positive signs. Four of six show that the degrees of the 
coefficients of AVHOME are larger than 1, whereas none of those of HOME are larger 
than 1. The degrees of the coefficients of AVHOME are, with the exception of column (5), 
distinctly larger than those of HOME. Thus it is evident that neighbor homeownership 
makes a greater contribution to increases in social capital formation than does 
individual homeownership.  
The evidence from the United States provided by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) 
shows that the local homeownership rate does not significantly affect social capital 
investment, while their model predicts that local homeownership rates will affect 
investment in social capital15. Thus the evidence from the United States is contrary to 
that from Japan, consistent with this research. One reason why the neighbor effect is 
different between the United States and Japan might be that collective action in 
Japanese society is more likely to depend on sanctioning and monitoring than in the 
United States (Yamagishi 1988a, 1988b).  
Significant negative signs for AGE, appeared in all estimations, seemingly reflecting 
                                                   
15 As stated in the data section, JGSS, is designed as the Japanese counterpart of the 
General Social Survey undertaken in the United States, which is used in DiPasquale 
and Glaeser (1999). Hence, the variables used in this study, to a certain degree, 
correspond to those used in DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999). In the U.S. General Social 
Survey, respondents were asked the question whether they had ever actively 
participated in trying to resolve a local problem. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) used 
the response to this question as a proxy variable for social capital. This index is thought 
to correspond to the proxy of social capital in this paper. 
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that older people are less likely to acquire benefits from long-term relationships within 
a community because their “remaining life” is shorter. This suggests that the behavior 
of Japanese is individualistic and rational. According to EDU representing years of 
schooling, higher-educated people can work for higher wages, resulting in larger 
opportunity costs. This leads us to expect that a higher number of years of schooling 
reduces the incentive to invest in social capital because of the larger opportunity cost. 
Contrary to this expectation, EDU yields positive signs and is statistically significant at 
the 1 % level. Though this result might be open to discussion, I interpreted it as follows. 
Assuming that the benefit from social capital investment from a long term point of view 
is larger than the current opportunity cost, educated people are more able to anticipate 
this. MARRI representing married people yields significant positive signs in all 
estimations, implying that people with a spouse are more likely to get involved in 
neighborhood associations.  
It is surprising to observe that the coefficients of MCITY and TOWN are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1 % level. This implies that compared with large 
cities (reference group), residents of medium-size cities, villages and towns are less 
inclined to invest in social capital, which is seemingly inconsistent with the argument 
presented thus far. What is more, the coefficient and z-statistics of TOWN are larger 
than those of MCITY. It follows from that observed in the results of MCITY and TOWN 
that people living in larger areas are more likely to invest in social capital, which is not 
in line with Table 2. I interpret these results as suggesting that those living in 
urbanized areas where people do not have an intimate acquaintance with neighbors are 
more likely to invest in social capital, if population immobility, which provides 
sanctioning and monitoring, is controlled for. That is, all else being equal, people living 
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in urban areas are more likely to make an acquaintance with a stranger and attempt to 
build new personal relationships with strangers. Conversely, people living in a 
tightly-knit community are more likely to maintain or improve relationships with 
acquaintances or colleagues in the neighborhood, but are less likely to interact with 
strangers. These suggest that the amount of accumulated social capital increases the 
incentive to improve or maintain existing well-established relationships within a 
community, but decreases the incentive to become acquainted with strangers and 
construct intimate relationship with them. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) define a 
well-established relationship as mutually committed relationships where the partner‟s 
cooperation is assured. What is more, they present the distinction between trust and 
assurance as “Trust requires social uncertainty, and assurance requires the lack of it” 
(Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994, p.160). Following this definition, “what is 
conventionally considered to characterize Japanese society is mutual assurance derived 
from the stability of interpersonal and/or interorganizational relations (Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi 1994, p.160)”. In this paper, investment in social capital is captured by 
participation in neighbor associations. Such investment enhanced by individual and 
neighbor homeownership is associated with assurance, rather than trust. On the other 
hand, investment in social capital, which is larger in urban areas than others, can 
relate with trust. If this is the case, the urbanized section of Japanese society can be 
characterized by trust, rather than assurance. Concerning this, urban Japan has 
changed from what could be described as traditional Japanese society to have 
characteristics that are shared with western society.  
 
5. Conclusions 
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Features of Japanese society concerning social capital appear to be different from 
those of Western societies, since Japanese people are more likely to be affected by 
long-term interpersonal relationships. Previous studies have well explored how and the 
extent to which the incentive to invest in social capital increases when individuals own 
their home. However, few works attempt to investigate the effects of a neighbor‟s 
homeownership on individual investment in social capital. In particular, the 
neighborhood effect stemming from population immobility is thought to have a greater 
effect in Japanese society than western ones, since monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms are more effective in Japan. This paper investigates how the circumstances 
of where a person resides are related to the degree of their investment in social capital 
using data of 1693 adult participants in the 2000 JGSS survey. Using instrumental 
variables to control for endogenous bias, I find the following;  
(1) Not only that an individual‟s homeownership is positively related to his/her 
investment in social capital, but that the rates of homeownership in a locality increase 
an individual‟s investments in social capital.  
(2) The effect of local neighbor homeownership on investment in social capital is 
distinctly larger than that of an individual‟s homeownership.  
(3) Residents in larger cities are more likely to invest in social capital than those in 
smaller ones.  
This study, by controlling for endogenous bias, showed that that the impact on social 
capital formation of a neighborhood‟s immobility is larger than that of an individual‟s 
when a person makes a decision regarding investment. What was highlighted in this 
exploration was that not only an individual„s characteristics but also the positive 
externality stemming from neighborhood immobility make a contribution to the 
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formation of social capital and hence should be considered in studies related to social 
capital. The evidence provided thus far, however, does not support the argument that 
Japanese people are more likely to behave based on some posited harmonious nature. 
The fact that residents in rural areas are less likely to invest in social capital than those 
in urban areas, after controlling for homeownership effects, suggests that traditional 
Japanese society is rather individualistic and rational when sanctioning and monitoring 
are not effective.  
This study did not control for unobservable individual characteristics although these 
are thought to cause estimation bias. To control for these, a panel data set needs to be 
used for estimations. That the local group defined in this work does not reflect the 
geographical scale, and so there is a possibility of measurement errors regarding the 
rate of homeowners in a locality, needs to be considered. This study was limited to 
Japan and the findings provided cannot be easily generalized. For the purpose of better 
verifying the generality of the arguments presented here, a study comparing results 
from other countries with different socio-cultural backgrounds would be required to be 
conducted using larger sample sizes. These are issues remaining to be addressed in 
future studies. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics related to respondents to survey 
 
 
Note:  a Rate 
       b Mean values 
c Thousands of yen  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Rate or 
mean  
SC a 
 
Takes 1 if one participates in the neighborhood association, 
otherwise takes 0. 
0.35 
HOME a 
 
Takes 1 if one is a homeowner, otherwise takes 0. 
 
0.76 
AVHOME 
 
Average value of HOME within an area. (Total HOME in the 
locality minus own HOME)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
______ 
MALE a 
 
Takes 1 if a person is male, otherwise takes 0.  0.43 
AGEb 
 
Ages of respondents. 53.0 
EDUb Years of schooling of respondents. 
 
11.6 
MARRI a Takes 1 if a respondent has a spouse, otherwise takes 0. 
 
0.86 
NCHILD 
 
Number of children 1.72 
MCITY a 
 
Takes 1 if a respondent lives in medium-sized city, otherwise 
takes 0.  
0.57 
TOWN a Takes 1 if a respondent lives in town and village, otherwise 
takes 0.  
 
0.24 
LAND75 b  
 
Land price in the prefecture of one‟s current residence in 1975 
(m2). 
 14.6 
APART75 b  
 
Rental price of private apartment for a month in the prefecture 
of one‟s current residence in 1975 (3.3m2). 
0.51 
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Table 2  
Relationship between the rate of homeowners and that of participation in 
neighborhood association 
 homeowner SC 
Large-sized city 
 
0.53 0.30 
Medium-size city 
 
0.76 0.37 
Town and village 
 
0.91 0.37 
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Table 3 
Determinants of investment for social capital: Probit model. 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
HOME 
 
0.08* 
(2.16) 
 0.08* 
(2.01) 
0.09** 
(2.71) 
 0.09** 
(2.60) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.11 
(0.96) 
0.06 
(0.47) 
 0.10 
(0.87) 
0.03 
(0.30) 
MALE 
 
0.04 
(1.63) 
0.04 
(1.51) 
0.04 
(1.59) 
0.06** 
(2.43) 
0.06** 
(2.33) 
0.06** 
(2.43) 
AGE 
 
0.001 
(1.05) 
0.001* 
(1.78) 
0.001 
(1.06) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(1.59) 
0.001 
(0.66) 
EDU 0.02** 
(3.95) 
0.02** 
(4.23) 
0.02** 
(3.99) 
0.02** 
(4.31) 
0.02** 
(4.61) 
0.02** 
(4.33) 
MARRI 0.22** 
(4.10) 
0.21** 
(3.94) 
0.22** 
(4.09) 
0.23** 
(4.88) 
0.22** 
(4.68) 
0.23** 
(4.86) 
NCHILD 
 
0.02* 
(1.91) 
0.02* 
(2.16) 
0.02* 
(1.93) 
0.02* 
(2.23) 
0.03** 
(2.53) 
0.02* 
(2.24) 
MCITY 0.03 
(0.62) 
0.02 
(0.40) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
0.04 
(0.85) 
0.04 
(0.70) 
0.03 
(0.69) 
TOWN 0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(-0.24) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
0.02 
(0.39) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
Income 
dummy a 
YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Area 
dummy b 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo  
R- square 
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Sample size 1545 1545 1545 1693 1693 1693 
Notes: Numbers are marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by using robust standard errors. Stata cluster 
command is used to address spatial autocorrelation within community members. Local areas consist of 105 groups which are identical 
to groups shown in Appendix (Table A1).  A constant term is included when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported 
to save space. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for annual income level, NO means that those are not included. There are 
19 income‟s categories.  
 b.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific effects, NO means that those are not included. There are 
5 area‟s categories. 
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Table 4  
Determinants of investment for social capital: Two-stage estimation. 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8)  
   Second stage (Probit)    
HOME 
 
0.80** 
(3.12) 
 0.97** 
(3.93) 
 0.91** 
(3.81) 
 1.04** 
(4.55) 
 
AVHOME 
 
 1.07 
(1.59) 
 1.83** 
(4.50) 
 0.94 
(1.46) 
 1.73** 
(4.58) 
MALE 
 
0.05* 
(2.05) 
0.02 
(0.75) 
0.06* 
(2.13) 
0.009 
(0.29) 
0.07** 
(2.77) 
0.05* 
(1.72) 
0.07** 
(2.84) 
0.04 
(1.39) 
AGE 
 
-0.004* 
(-2.03) 
0.001 
(1.48) 
-0.006** 
(-2.67) 
0.001 
(1.28) 
-0.006** 
(-2.74) 
0.001 
(1.35) 
-0.007** 
(-3.30) 
0.001 
(1.12) 
EDU 0.01 
(1.58) 
0.02** 
(4.39) 
0.01 
(1.26) 
0.02** 
(4.68) 
0.01* 
(1.75) 
0.03** 
(4.76) 
0.01 
(1.48) 
0.03** 
(5.06) 
MARRI 0.29** 
(4.58) 
0.20** 
(3.74) 
0.30** 
(4.84) 
0.19** 
(3.60) 
0.30** 
(5.70) 
0.21** 
(4.44) 
0.31** 
(5.95) 
0.21** 
(4.33) 
NCHILD 
 
-0.001 
(-0.10) 
0.03* 
(2.28) 
-0.007 
(-0.46) 
0.03** 
(2.41) 
-0.07 
(-0.10) 
0.03** 
(2.60) 
-0.005 
(-0.37) 
0.03** 
(2.75) 
MCITY -0.07 
(-1.02) 
-0.20 
(-1.30) 
-0.09 
(-1.48) 
-0.37** 
(-3.51) 
-0.08 
(-1.35) 
-0.16 
(-1.04) 
-0.10* 
(-1.80) 
-0.34** 
(-3.30) 
TOWN -0.11 
(-1.41) 
-0.31 
(-1.52) 
-0.13* 
(-1.88) 
-0.46** 
(-3.96) 
-0.12* 
(-1.72) 
-0.26 
(-1.29) 
-0.14* 
(-2.14) 
-0.44** 
(-3.83) 
Income 
dummy a 
YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Area dummy 
b 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo  
R- square 
0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Sample size 1545 1545 1545 1545 1693 1693 1693 1693 
   First stage (Dependent variable)    
 HOME 
(Probit) 
AVHOME 
(OLS) 
       HOME 
(Probit) 
AVHOME 
(OLS) 
  
LAND75 
 
-0.002 
(-1.30) 
-0.004* 
(-2.12) 
  -0.001 
(-0.97) 
-0.003* 
(-2.01) 
  
29 
 
 LRchi 2=339.9 
Prob> chi 2=0 
F=85.7 
Prob> F=0 
  LRchi2=383.2 
Prob> chi 2=0 
F=218.4 
Prob> F=0 
  
   HOME         AVHOME 
(Probit )        (OLS) 
 HOME 
(Probit ) 
AVHOME 
(OLS) 
APART75 
 
  -0.03* 
(-1.75) 
-0.06** 
(-3.25) 
  -0.02 
(-1.54) 
-0.06** 
(-3.28) 
   LRchi2=341.2 
Prob> chi 2=0 
F=93.5 
Prob> F=0 
  LRchi2=384.6 
Prob> chi 2=0 
F=239.3 
Prob> F=0 
Notes: Numbers are marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by using robust standard errors. Stata cluster 
command is used to address spatial autocorrelation within community members. Local areas consist of 105 groups which are identical 
to groups shown in Appendix (Table A1).  A constant term is included when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported 
to save space. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
a. YES means that dummy variables are included to control for annual income level, NO means that those are not included. There are 
19 income‟s categories.  
 b. YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific effects, NO means that those are not included. There are 
5 area‟s categories. 
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Table 5 Determinants of investment for social capital: Probit model (two-stage). 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Second stage (Probit)   
HOME 
 
0.67** 
(2.66) 
0.68** 
(2.76) 
0.65** 
(2.62) 
0.81** 
(3.67) 
0.81** 
(3.78) 
0.79** 
(3.55) 
AVHOME 
 
1.31** 
(3.13) 
0.84* 
(1.94) 
1.44** 
(3.30) 
1.18** 
(3.16) 
0.55 
(1.48) 
1.32** 
(3.29) 
MALE 
 
0.03 
(0.96) 
0.04 
(1.27) 
0.02 
(0.85) 
0.05* 
(2.00) 
0.06** 
(2.33) 
0.05* 
(1.92) 
AGE 
 
-0.004* 
(-1.80) 
-0.004* 
(-1.82) 
-0.004* 
(-1.78) 
-0.005** 
(-2.73) 
-0.005** 
(-2.69) 
-0.005* 
(-2.64) 
EDU 0.01* 
(2.17) 
0.01* 
(2.03) 
0.01* 
(2.25) 
0.01* 
(2.30) 
0.01* 
(2.14) 
0.01* 
(2.40) 
MARRI 0.27** 
(4.16) 
0.27** 
(4.25) 
0.26** 
(4.10) 
0.29** 
(5.38) 
0.29** 
(5.46) 
0.29** 
(5.31) 
NCHILD 
 
0.006 
(0.37) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.006 
(0.42) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
0.005 
(0.38) 
MCITY -0.36** 
(-3.53) 
-0.25** 
(-2.35) 
-0.38** 
(-3.69) 
-0.34** 
(-3.47) 
-0.20* 
(-1.97) 
-0.37** 
(-3.61) 
TOWN -0.43** 
(-3.73) 
-0.33** 
(-2.52) 
-0.45** 
(-3.87) 
-0.42** 
(-3.71) 
-0.27* 
(-2.13) 
-0.44** 
(-3.82) 
Income dummy a YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Area dummy b YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- square 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Sample size 1545 1545 1545 1693 1693 1693 
  First stage   
  Dependent variable =HOME: (Probit)    
LAND75 
 
-0.0008 
(-0.28) 
0.01 
(1.10) 
 -0.0004 
(-0.14) 
0.01 
(1.29) 
 
LAND75 2 
 
 -0.0003 
(-1.52) 
  -0.0003 
(-1.66) 
 
APART75 
 
-0.02 
(-0.79) 
 0.005 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(-0.77) 
 0.002 
(0.02) 
APART75 2   -0.008   -0.006 
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 (-0.38) (-0.31) 
 LRchi2=341.4 
Prob> chi 2=0 
LRchi2=343.6 
Prob> chi 2=0 
LRchi2=341.4 
Prob> chi 2=0 
LRchi 2=348.6 
Prob> chi 2=0 
LRchi2=388.0 
Prob> chi 2=0 
LRchi 2=384.7 
Prob> chi 2=0 
  Dependent variable =AVHOME: (OLS)   
LAND75 
 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
0.01 
(1.44) 
 -0.001 
(-0.39) 
0.01 
(1.55) 
 
LAND75 2 
 
 -0.0004* 
(-2.15) 
  -0.0004* 
(-2.26) 
 
APART75 
 
-0.05 
(1.64) 
 -0.09 
(-1.26) 
-0.05* 
(-1.70) 
 -0.09 
(-1.22) 
APART75 2 
 
  0.008 
(0.45) 
  0.007 
(0.41) 
 F=91.4 
Prob> F=0 
F=89.9 
Prob> F=0 
F=90.9 
Prob> F=0 
F=224.6 
Prob> F=0 
F=221.6 
Prob> F=0 
F=223.7 
Prob> F=0 
Notes: Numbers are marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by using robust standard errors. Stata cluster 
command is used to address spatial autocorrelation within community members. Local areas consist of 105 groups which are identical 
to groups shown in Appendix (Table A1).  A constant term is included when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported 
to save space. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
a. YES means that dummy variables are included to control for annual income level, NO means that those are not included. There are 
19 income‟s categories.  
 b. YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific effects, NO means that those are not included. There are 
5 area‟s categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1  Rates of homeowners 
 Prefecture total large medium Town and 
village 
1 Hokkaido 0.66 0.49 0.70 0.80 
2 Aomori 0.91  0.87 1 
3 Iwate 0.82  0.80 0.85 
4 Miyagi .78 0.63 0.83 0.89 
5 Akita 0.91  0.86 0.98 
6 Yamagata 0.93  0.94 0.90 
7 Fukushima 0.87  0.88 0.84 
8 Ibaragi 0.83  0.74 0.96 
9 Tochigi 0.85  0.81 0.92 
10 Gunma 0.88  0.86 0.92 
11 Saitama 0.73 0.61 0.70 0.92 
12 Chiba 0.75 0.53 0.76 0.85 
13 Tokyo 0.50 0.47 0.58  
14 Kanagawa 0.66 0.63 0.68 0.72 
15 Niigata 0.94  0.91 0.99 
16 Toyama 0.97  0.97 0.97 
17 Ishikawa 0.81  0.81 0.81 
18 Fukui 0.92  0.90 1 
19 Yamanashi 0.90  0.92 0.88 
20 Nagano 0.93  0.91 0.95 
21 Gifu 0.90  0.88 0.95 
22 Shizuoka 0.83  0.82 0.85 
23 Aichi 0.70 0.36 0.77 0.93 
24 Mie 0.92  0.89 0.98 
25 Shiga 0.81  0.73 0.92 
26 Kyoto 0.82 0.71 0.96 0.88 
27 Osaka 0.51 0.40 0.53 0.93 
28 Hyogo 0.70 0.62 0.68 0.92 
29 Nara 0.76  0.66 1 
30 Wakayama 0.82  0.79 0.87 
31 Tottori 0.70  0.56 1 
32 Shimane 0.80  0.62 1 
33 Okayama 0.88  0.87 0.94 
34 Hiroshima 0.82 0.71 0.88 0.87 
35 Yamaguchi 0.81  0.75 0.96 
36 Tokushima 0.86  0.76 0.95 
37 Kagawa 0.94  0.90 1 
38 Ehime 0.81  0.76 0.90 
39 Kochi 0.82  0.74 0.92 
40 Fukuoka 0.68 0.44 0.78 0.91 
41 Saga 0.80  0.64 0.94 
42 Nagasaki 0.65  0.65 0.64 
43 Kumamoto 0.82  0.75 0.92 
44 Oita 0.79  0.76 0.84 
45 Miyazaki 0.87  0.83 1 
46 Kagoshima 0.75  0.70 0.81 
47 Okinawa 0.57  0.43 0.85 
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Figure1.  Relationship between homeowner rates within an area and investment of 
social capital  
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(a) Land price 
 
  
(b) Rental price for an apartment 
 
 
Figure2.  Relationship between land price (rental price for an apartment) and the 
homeowner rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
